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This paper explores naturalism and supernaturalism as modes of disclosure that reveal and 
conceal different aspects of relationality. Naturalism is presented as a worldview or set of 
philosophical assumptions that posits an objective world that is separable from persons and 
discoverable or describable via scientific methods. Because psychotherapy tacitly endorses many 
naturalistic assumptions, psychotherapy relationships may be limited to an instrumentalist ethic 
premised upon use-value and manipulability. Given these naturalistic limitations, relationships 
may require a supernatural component – a component which reaches beyond the naturalistic and 
into the miraculous. The alternative grounding for this supernatural disclosure is found in the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger and that of Emmanuel Levinas, the former emphasizing the 
possibilities inherent in contemplative rather than calculative disclosures, and the latter 
emphasizing ethical obligation and absolute otherness. A therapeutic case is discussed as an 
exemplar of both kinds of relational disclosure – that is, naturalistic and supernaturalistic – and 




Naturalistic and Supernaturalistic Disclosures: 
The Possibility of Relational Miracles 
 
Meaningful human relationships – which include 
those contained within the context of psychotherapy – 
invoke the miraculous. The phenomenological thinker 
and psychological historian J. H. van den Berg (1961) 
points to this as inhering in a particular quality 
definitive of interpersonal “nearness”:  
 
There must be sense in God’s becoming 
visible. His visibility is the nearness 
between man and man. There is no other 
nearness. When God is with us, He does 
not appear as a transparent ghost in the 
realm of the dead. He stands face to face 
with us as an acquaintance, a friend, a wife, 
a husband, or a child. (p. 198) 
Obviously, van den Berg is speaking in a particularly 
theistic vein here, and this paper does not endorse the 
bias of his choice of terminology. Underpinning van 
den Berg’s (1961) assertion, however, is the notion of 
an overlooked, supernatural component as present in 
every relationship of “nearness” between people – 
which presence van den Berg (1961) calls “God”.   
 
By “supernatural”, I mean beyond or outside of the 
reach of naturalistic explanations or relationships. The 
dichotomy invoked here between “supernatural” and 
“naturalistic” deserves brief comment. When I say 
that supernatural explanations are those explanations 
that move beyond naturalistic ones, I do not intend to 
suggest anything about nature itself. Rather, 
naturalistic explanations and naturalism are ways of 
seeing nature. As such, naturalistic explanations and 
naturalism comprise a set of assumptions made about 
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nature (Slife, 2004). One might, indeed, say that 
naturalism is a modern way of understanding nature 
naturalistically, with such an understanding quite 
independent of one’s experience of the natural world. 
The main contention of this paper is that a super-
natural component is the crux of both the possibility 
and the foundation of a meaningful relationship. From 
this perspective, miracles (as the epitome of the 
supernatural) are changes that bring a person “near” 
or “into relationship” (van den Berg, 1961). 
 
But why call “changes that bring a person near” or 
“into relationship” a miracle? Not only might the term 
“miracle” seem strange or out of place, but the 
proposed definition may seem even more strange. 
Miracles have traditionally been considered to be 
divine interventions in the human world which defy 
the naturalistic order of things (for instance, God’s 
intervention in human affairs). In this view, miracles 
are defined against a naturalistic worldview. 
Additionally, from the naturalistic view, miraculous 
explanations of events are often viewed as primitive 
or magical – subjective projections that have little to 
do with what are thought to be accurate descriptions 
of events within the naturalistic world (Slife & 
Williams, 1995). These unsophisticated “miraculous” 
explanations have become unnecessary and untenable 
in the modern world with the advent of naturalism 
and the rise of scientific explanation. 
 
This paper will examine how naturalism and the 
particular mode of disclosure (Heidegger, 1954/1977) 
that it entails impacts relationships, particularly 
relationships in psychotherapy. We will see that 
relationships are ultimately limited to a calculative 
and instrumentalist ethic when undergirded by the 
assumptions of naturalism (Heidegger, 1954/1977; 
Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999; Taylor, 
1991). A different kind of disclosure or understanding 
of relationships – one that allows for the supernatural 
and its view of the miraculous – is offered as an 
alternative. This alternative is grounded in the 
respective philosophies of Martin Heidegger (1959/ 
1966) and Emmanuel Levinas (1961/1969). 
 
As stated above, one of the main assertions of this 
paper is that relationships require a supernatural 
component – a component that is beyond the 
naturalistic or out of the reach of the naturalistic. If 
this is the case, then naturalistic explanations are 
potentially problematic for relationships because they 
rule out such supernatural possibilities. As we will 
see, the miraculous and relationships are intimately 
related in the context of the supernatural. As van den 
Berg elaborates above, meaningful closeness in 
relationships is the miracle that requires the context of 
the supernatural. Hence, miracles in the supernatural 
view are meant to be understood in a relational, 
experiential and shared manner. This alternative view 
of the miraculous in terms of meaningful closeness in 
relationships will be discussed later in a therapeutic 
case study.  
 
The Rise of Naturalism 
 
Naturalism refers to a philosophical worldview or set 
of assumptions about nature (Slife, 2004). In general, 
nature is objectified and presumed to be in constant, 
regular patterns of causal interaction (usually efficient 
and material causal relationships or patterns). When 
these causal patterns are observed and described – 
often with the help of scientific method – they are 
translated into natural laws or principles which are 
thought to govern the movement of objects in nature 
(Slife & Williams, 1995). Despite the success of 
scientific explanations in terms of understanding the 
natural world, there continues to be debate about the 
role of science and its ability to disclose aspects of 
natural reality. For instance, there are questions about 
whether scientific theories explain a presumed, 
underlying causal structure of the universe (that is, the 
realist view) or whether scientific theories are limited 
to descriptions of observations of the universe (that is, 
the antirealist view) (Kitcher, 1989; Salmon, 1984; 
van Frassen, 1980). In either case, however, scientific 
method tends to be used to explain the world with 
reference to naturalistic theories, and, at least from 
this view, supernatural theories are often rejected as 
acceptable explanations of the world. Indeed, 
naturalistic explanations have come to be seen as 
more truthful or accurate descriptions of the world, 
supplanting what is considered from the naturalistic 
view to be the more naïve supernatural and 
miraculous explanations (Polkinghorne, 1983). 
 
Materialism and Mechanism 
 
One of the consequences of the rise of naturalism as 
an explanatory system included a new understanding 
of human beings. Prior to the advent of naturalism, 
reality and human interaction were thought to be 
governed by sacred structures grounded in the 
meaning and significance of the will of God and the 
great chain of Being (Taylor, 1991; Taylor, 2007). All 
human stations in life held meaning and purpose 
based upon this greater cosmic and divine order. As 
Jones (1969) describes this pre-modern era, “The 
universe was a vast sacerdotal system: It had no 
meaning or value in itself; its importance lay in the 
role it played – partly symbol, partly stage-set – in the 
drama of man’s salvation” (p. 1). Hence, human 
beings were not simply human beings. They were 
children of God, and the supreme task of life was to 
secure the proper relation to God and thereby secure 
their salvation (Jones, 1969). 
 
However, with the rise of modern naturalistic 
explanation, humans came to be seen as physical 
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objects among other physical objects interacting 
within the realm of ordered nature (Husserl, 1954/ 
1970). Galileo’s laws of accelerated motion and 
Newton’s general laws of motion established the 
science of mechanics, and, ultimately, this physical 
and mechanical view of the universe extended to 
human beings as well. As Husserl (1954/1970) 
explains, the “soul” became “something real in a 
sense similar to corporeal nature, the subject matter of 
natural science” (p. 212). As a result, the horizontal 
relationships of human beings to others and of human 
beings to nature became more important than the 
vertical relationship of human beings to God. Indeed, 
God was basically displaced – or at least made 
unessential – as an explanatory force within the 
context of naturalism (Gunton, 2000). As Robinson 
(1995), a leading psychological historian explains, 
  
What Newton demonstrated was that bodies 
set in motion would continue to move, 
linearly and eternally, unless acted upon by 
a force opposed to their motion. Quite 
simply, once the bodies were set in motion, 
God’s will had no further work to do for the 
motion to continue forever. (p. 235) 
 
The primacy of naturalistic explanations persists in 
the contemporary context (Husserl, 1954/1970). In 
the realm of human psychology, natural laws are 
postulated that are thought to govern our “bodies, 
behaviours, and minds” (Slife, 2004, p. 45).1 Consider 
a therapist who views her client’s depression in terms 
of the neurotransmitter or genetic theories of 
depression (Aznar et al., 2010; Neumeister, Charney, 
Drevets, & Tamminga, 2005; van der Stelt, Breuer, 
Olivier, & Westenberg, 2005). It is presumed by 
many researchers and practitioners alike that, with 
more rigorous empirical investigation, the genetic and 
neurochemical pathways of depression (which are 
often assumed to be governed by law-like processes) 
will be better understood, thereby allowing for better 
treatment approaches (Andreasen, 2001; McIntyre et 
al., 2007; Robertson et al., 2007). From this natural-
istic perspective, the therapeutic relationship often 
takes a backseat to the genetic and neurochemical 
“laws” that are thought to govern depression.   
 
Indeed, the emphasis on materiality (that is, 
physiology) and its mechanistic properties ultimately 
rules out any meaningful relational interaction 
between therapist and client. If clients are ultimately 
determined by hypothesized natural laws (for 
                                                 
1 While there is some debate between metaphysical and 
methodological naturalism, with the former being viewed 
as reductive and the latter being viewed as potentially 
non-reductive, this paper’s contention is that the tacit 
endorsement of naturalism by psychology tends to be of 
the metaphysical variety. 
example, the hypothesized genetic and neuro-
transmitter theories mentioned above), then all that is 
needed to control or change clients (at least 
theoretically) is knowledge of the laws. In the case of 
the genetic and neurotransmitter theories, knowledge 
of the laws implies changes in the patient’s 
neurochemistry, which in turn implicates pharmaco-
therapies as a treatment approach. Hence, when such 
hypothesized laws are taken seriously, the interaction 
between patient and physician, for example, is often 
reduced to medication maintenance – a discussion 
surrounding the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the 
prescribed medication in relation to the patient’s 
observed clinical symptoms. In this naturalistic 
context, engaged, experiential and relational contact 
between doctor and patient is ruled out. The relational 
miracle that van den Berg alludes to cannot occur 
when the patient is objectified and reduced to a 
physical, material and mechanized structure only (for 
a more lengthy discussion of material reductionism, 
see Bennett & Hacker, 2003; cf. Garza & Fisher 
Smith, 2009). This is not to say, of course, that 
psychiatrists and their patients, or therapists and their 
clients, do not have meaningful relational therapeutic 
contact. Many do. The point is to note how 
naturalistic prejudices make such meaningful and 
ultimately miraculous relational contact difficult if 
not impossible. 
 
Naturalistic Frameworks and Relationships 
 
The Enframing, Standing Reserve, and Calculative 
Thinking   
 
Viewing persons as part of a naturalistic world is, for 
Heidegger (1954/1977), a specific style of 
“disclosure” of humans and the world. Heidegger 
(1954/1977) discusses this disclosure in his 
explication of the source of the technological essence 
in the world – what he calls the “Enframing”. The 
“Enframing” itself is nothing technological or 
mechanical, but rather a mode of revealing or 
disclosure that constitutes the technological world-
view (Heidegger, 1954/1977, p. 302). Under the 
Enframing, human beings are called upon to reveal 
things and others within the world as “enframed in a 
certain way, namely as there merely for our use” 
(Rojcewicz, 2006, p. 104). Others and things are 
revealed in terms of quantification, resource, 
calculation, and “standing reserve” (Heidegger, 1954/ 
1977, p. 301). As “standing reserve”, things are 
always on hand for future use. 
 
For instance, human beings are challenged to disclose 
the environment in terms of quantification and 
“standing reserve”. Indeed, Heidegger (1954/1977) 
asserts that the environment or nature itself is 
disclosed as the “chief storehouse of the standing 
reserve energy” (p. 302). In other words, nature is 
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perceived as an energy supply source from which we 
“unlock” energy; “what is unlocked is transformed, 
what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, 
in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched 
about ever anew” (Heidegger, 1954/1977, p. 298). 
The guiding direction for unlocking these energy 
resources and preserving them for future use is a 
means-and-ends type of calculation that aspires to 
retain the “maximum yield at the minimum expense” 
(Heidegger, 1954/1977, p. 297). Thus, the kind of 
relationship we have with things in our environment 
under the Enframing and as standing reserve is one of 
use-value and manipulability.   
 
Human beings suffer a similar fate and are not 
excluded from being viewed in terms of use-value 
and manipulability as standing-reserve. Under the 
Enframing, and through the vehicle of naturalistic 
prejudices, humans themselves are disclosed as 
resources to be used. The result is that humans are 
disclosed and “look[ed] upon as disposables”, and 
therefore the mode of relating or relationship between 
them is also one of use-value and manipulability 
(Rojcewicz, 2006, p. 105). For instance, in industry, 
persons are described as human “resources”, and, in 
medicine, clinics and hospitals have a “supply” of 
patients (Heidegger, 1954/1977, p. 299). Heidegger 
(1959/1966) has described this mode of relationship 
elsewhere in terms of calculation or “calculative 
thinking” that “computes ever new, ever more 
promising and at the same time more economical 
possibilities” (p. 46). From this perspective, persons 
are viewed economically and strategically as serving 
certain ends or purposes, rather than as being ends in 
themselves. For Heidegger, the primacy of use-value 
in the Enframing and the instrumentality of calcula-
tive thinking are ultimately dangers to humanity. 
 
Consider as a contemporary example of this type of 
calculative disclosure the first-person account of the 
Rwandan genocide by Canadian Lieutenant General 
Romeo Dallaire, the commander assigned as the 
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping general during the 
Rwandan crisis of 1994 (Dallaire & Beardsley, 2003). 
In his account, Dallaire decried the failure of the 
richest members of the UN (including the United 
States) to intervene in the Rwandan crisis and thereby 
potentially prevent the loss of almost one million 
lives murdered over the course of one hundred days – 
what has now come to be known as the Rwandan 
Genocide. What was particularly horrific to Dallaire 
and to many others was that the ambivalence and 
ultimate failure of many nations to intercede and 
potentially prevent the genocide was a result of their 
calculated, economic and instrumental reasoning. 
Rwanda, in the eyes of the world powers at the time, 
simply lacked any “strategic or resource value” (that 
is, use-value) that made it worth their intervening 
(Dallaire & Beardsley, 2003, p. 6).   
One important danger of the calculative view, then, is 
that the means-to-ends reasoning it endorses not only 
reduces everything to its use-value, but has the 
capacity to prioritize self-serving interests over 
others. The possibility of exploitation is always at 
play from the calculative perspective, and literally 
“amounts to an attack on things” and others in the 
world around us (Rojcewicz, 2006, p. 215). As 
Rojcewicz (2006) explains, calculative thinking “sees 
all things as there to be ravished and motivates their 
actual ravishment” (p. 216). While the Rwandan 
example is extreme, its acuteness also demonstrates 
how the miraculous dissipates in the context of 
calculative thinking and the naturalistic worldview 
from which it emerges. While this mode of disclosure 
perhaps implies something about how forms of 
brutalization can erupt between groups within the 
genocide itself, for the more immediate purposes of 
this paper, it also speaks to the calculated bystander 
mentality of the spectator nations who failed to 
intercede to thwart the genocide based upon their own 
calculated and strategic interests. Such a calculative 
disclosure distances and removes us from the 
humanity and supernatural possibility in relationships, 
thereby contributing to the multiple factors that 
allowed (in the case of Rwanda) the genocide to 
unfold (Staub, 1999; Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & 
Hagengimana, 2005). 
 
Naturalism, Calculative Thinking, and Psychotherapy 
 
Relationships in psychotherapy, like many modern 
relationships, have not necessarily escaped the mode 
of revealing inherent in the Enframing. When the 
predominant mode of relationship between therapist 
and client is one of use-value, manipulability and 
means-to-end instrumentality, then the therapeutic 
relationship is being disclosed according to the 
Heideggerian (1959/1966) notion of calculative 
thinking. While many therapists and clients probably 
do not consider their own motives or actions as 
calculative (particularly in the way discussed in the 
Rwandan example above), Heidegger’s radical point 
is to note that this calculative and instrumentalist 
disclosure is already present and implicit in the taken-
for-granted meanings that are embedded in culture. 
Psycho-therapy, being already a part of culture, 
partakes implicitly of these meanings. For instance, 
clients enter therapy with the tacit expectation of 
attaining maximum results (that is, alleviating 
distress) with minimal demands on their time and 
finances, as well as the expectation of rapid and 
successful treatment (Lambert, Bergin, & Garfield, 
2004). The rise in popularity of the brief 
psychotherapy treatments seems to be, in part, a 
response to these client expectations of maximum 
yield at minimum expense.   
 
Indeed, almost all therapies that are now empirically 
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studied are viewed as brief, given the twin demands 
of consumer expectation and managed care’s 
requirement of cost-efficiency (Lambert et al., 2004, 
p. 10). Psychotherapy researchers have become 
attuned to the concerns of cost-efficiency by 
examining the psychotherapy outcome relationship 
between “dose of treatment” and therapeutic 
“response” (Lambert et al., 2004, p. 10). This dose-
response research essentially demonstrates that 
smaller “doses” of psychotherapy treatment are as 
effective, and therefore more efficient, than larger 
“doses” (for instance, about half of the patients who 
undergo psychotherapy show improvements by the 
eighth session and clinically meaningful change after 
thirteen to eighteen sessions) (Anderson & Lambert, 
2001; Hansen, Lambert, & Forman, 2002). From this 
outcome research perspective, it “makes good 
economic sense” to limit the amount of therapy if the 
therapeutic gains for the client can be achieved in a 
shorter amount of time (Lambert et al., 2004, p. 10).   
 
The very goals of brief therapy, dose-effect research 
and managed care seem undergirded by calculative 
thinking – the means/end calculation that seeks 
maximum benefit at minimal cost. From this view, 
therapeutic relationships may be limited by an 
inherent self-interest and self-focus that views the 
relationship from all sides as a means to secure the 
reciprocal benefit for all the parties involved (that is, 
client, therapist, and third party payer). This is not to 
say, of course, that all psychotherapy is conducted 
with a means/end calculating agenda. Rather, the 
point is that, when human beings are, as is inherent in 
calculative-instrumental thinking, disclosed and 
understood as manipulable resources, then viewing 
psychotherapy as self-serving contractualism seems 
inevitable (Guignon, 1992). 
 
How can a psychotherapeutic relationship – or any 
relationship – be caring for the other’s best interests 
when it is limited from the outset by a self-interested 
means/end calculation? The highest and most noble 
relationship achievable here is mere quid pro quo. 
The only relationship that a naturalized world, 
interpreted as standing-reserve, can leave, then, is a 
hopelessly impoverished one. What remains to be 
seen are the kind of relationships that are possible 
within a non-natural – or perhaps supernatural and 
miraculous – worldview. Unfortunately, though, 
miracles have faded away, at least from a naturalistic 
perspective. However, as van den Berg (1961) notes, 
miracles only became obsolete when they were 
required to defy the mechanistic and lawful order of 
nature. He argues, “… the miracle is not contra 
naturam; it is the nature of the contra naturam world 
which is contra miraculum” (p. 203). What might be 
needed, then, is not so much a miracle that defies the 
natural order of things as an alternative disclosure – 
or, in Heidegger’s (1954/1977) terms, a different 
Enframing, that might allow for the miraculous and a 
different kind of relationship between things, others 
and world to emerge.  
 




Heidegger’s (1959/1966) alternative to calculative 
thinking and instrumentalism is what he describes as 
“meditative thinking” (p. 46). Rojcewicz (2006) 
translates meditative thinking as “contemplative 
thinking” (p. 216), and argues that this translation is 
especially apropos, because “contemplation is what is 
carried out in a temple, namely a communing with the 
divine, a raising of the sight to the gods, a gazing into 
the realm of Being” (p. 216). Hence, contemplation 
requires an attunement to the supernatural that 
harkens back to communion with the divine.   
 
Because contemplation is a special kind of thinking 
carried out in a temple, it is also a kind of thinking 
that is set aside to observe an “augury”, or “a being 
which bears a divine message” (Rojcewicz, 2006, p. 
216). Hence, the proper attitude before an other is 
contemplation of a kind that views him or her as an 
augury. This is in direct contradistinction to viewing 
an other in calculation as a resource to be used. 
Translated into therapeutic terms, the goals of therapy 
cannot be achieved through technical proficiency or 
mastery alone (for example, by relying entirely on 
therapeutic technique, which in many cases implies 
performing a treatment on the client or teaching a 
skill to the client in light of the strategic therapy 
goals). This would be a recapitulation of calculation 
and instrumentalism. Rather, the goals of therapy are 
achieved through the kind of contemplative attitude or 
presence the therapist has before the client – a 
presence that allows for the divine to emerge. 
Viewing others as auguries, then, as messengers of 
the divine, is what allows for the miraculous in 
relationships.   
 
A second aspect of contemplative thinking that 
Heidegger (1959/1966) discusses is “openness to the 
mystery” – particularly an openness to the hidden 
meanings of technology that are embedded in the 
calculative view (p. 55). While Heidegger’s main 
thrust is to emphasize the meaning of technology, his 
use of the term mystery as a simultaneously revealing 
and concealing dimension is particularly relevant with 
respect to the kind of relationship that contemplative 
thinking discloses. In an important sense, others are 
themselves mysteries, in that what is revealed in them 
is only an incomplete or partial profile of who they 
are. Hence, in the contemplative view, certain aspects 
are revealed in others while other aspects remain 
hidden. We can never know other persons completely 
given this quality of their mysteriousness. If 
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Heidegger’s insights are applied therapeutically, they 
seem to suggest that clients can never be wholly 
known, given their sacredness as grounded in their 
mystery, and, ultimately, as grounded in Being.  
 
For Heidegger (1959/1966), the divine message and 
the mystery are inherently connected to that which is 
closest to us as beings: the essence of beings, or the 
meaning of Being. As Rojcewicz (2006) elaborates,  
 
In contemplation, we see through beings, 
see Being through them. Indeed, for 
Heidegger, beings are the only path to 
Being. We mortals have no direct access to 
Being. But it is one thing to take beings as 
revealing Being and another thing to look 
upon beings as merely there to satisfy our 
self-interest. The first way is sincere, the 
other calculating. (p. 223)  
 
Heidegger’s ultimate concerns are obviously 
ontological. Even his understanding of divinity – the 
supernatural aspect of contemplative thinking that 
allows for relationship – is linked in a fundamental 
way to ontology. According to Heidegger (1959/ 
1966), the most significant danger or threat lies in 
humanity’s potential to forgo one kind of thinking 
(for instance, contemplative thinking) for another (for 
instance, calculative thinking), particularly because 
Heidegger views human beings themselves as 
contemplative in their essence.   
 
Infinity   
 
In contrast to Heidegger’s (1954/1977; 1959/1966) 
emphasis on ontology as the pivot-point for pointing 
beyond naturalism, Levinas (1961/1969) underscores 
what he believes are our pre-existing ethical 
obligations to others as the grounds for supernatural 
relationalism. Firstly, Levinas (1961/1969) insists that 
an encounter with the other presents more to the 
self/ego than could ever be known by the self alone. 
Hence, Levinas concludes that the Other introduces 
the notion of excess and transcendence, “the idea of 
that which exceeds all ideas, the idea of infinity” 
(Manning, 1993, p. 114). Even though we may 
attempt to capture the Other within the bounds of an 
intellectual category (for example, diagnosis), the 
Other’s excess always spills over such boundaries – 
into infinity.  Part of the Other, then, remains elusive 
and mysterious. For Levinas (1961/1969), the excess, 
elusiveness and incomprehensibility of the Other 
ultimately emanate from the Other’s sacredness – a 
sacredness that is made manifest in the human face. 
 
The face of the Other reveals an “epiphany of the 
infinite, of absolute otherness”, and absolute other-
ness is symbolic of God broadly speaking (Peperzak, 
1993, p. 63). Others come to us, then, from a 
dimension that surpasses us. In Levinas’s (1961/1969) 
understanding, Others are revealed to us from “on 
high”, and this height which exceeds us is the trace of 
God in the Other. As Levinas (1969/1961) explains, 
“Man as Other comes to us from the outside, a 
separated – or holy – face” (p. 291). Merleau-Ponty 
(1942/1983) argues something similar when he notes 
that “it seems impossible for us to treat a face or a 
body … like a thing”, because “they are sacred 
entities” (p. 167). Thus, as van den Berg (1961) 
seemed to allude to earlier, all human beings bear a 
“divine” presence – a supernatural, even miraculous 
presence – which is revealed in the face of the other, 
and, ultimately, in one’s relationship to the Other. 
 
However, this “divine” presence or “holy face” is 
easily overlooked, and can only be revealed when we 
are attuned to what Levinas (1961/1969) describes as 
our ethical obligation to Others. For Levinas, 
disclosing others means, at the most fundamental 
level, revealing them in light of an inherent ethical 
obligation. Indeed, the Other demands and commands 
this ethical obligation. From this ethical perspective, 
Others are never viewed as resources or as means to 
maximize personal ends, as is the case with 
naturalism and instrumental reason. Rather, Others 
are treated as ends in themselves given the a priori 
presence of the ethical obligation. This is not to say, 
of course, that other forms of disclosure are not 
possible.   
 
The Problem of Egology and Violence 
 
Rather than viewing Others in ethical concern, for 
instance, we can view Others through the functional 
roles they fill in our lives (Levinas, 1961/1969). In 
this case, the Other becomes a “useful or enjoyable 
part of my world, with a specific role and function” 
(Peperzak, 1993, p. 19). This is reminiscent, of 
course, of viewing persons as Heidegger’s (1954/ 
1977) standing reserve – as objects for one’s use. In 
Levinas’s terminology, disclosing Others in terms of 
their functionality or use-value is referred to as 
“egology” (Peperzak, 1993, p. 15). An “egological” 
perspective infers that everything in the world is 
reduced and integrated to the demands of the self-
contained ego or self. The ego/self appropriates and 
subordinates all elements and events in the world in 
an effort to understand them and make them sensible. 
In other words, knowing things and Others within the 
world comes to mean a kind of subordination through 
possession of those very things and Others. Consider 
our cultural notion of a highly individualistic self that 
stresses autonomy and separateness through a 
“possession of” or an “incorporation of” things and 
events around us (Cushman, 1990). This is clear even 
in our characteristic description of everyday events by 
utilizing the possessive form of language – my dinner, 
my birthday, my husband, my wife, my children, my 
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clients, my doctor. Everything is understood from the 
vantage point of the ego/self. This kind of egological 
appropriation does not allow for the Other to be 
recognized as a truly separate other, and a functional- 
instrumental relationship is more likely to occur.   
 
In addition to being described as egological, such 
attempts to contain the Other, either physically or 
intellectually, constitutes “totalization” by the ego/ 
self, and totalization is equivalent to committing 
violence against the other (Peperzak, 1993, p. 128). In 
the psychotherapeutic relationship, we can perhaps 
easily conceptualize the results of egological 
totalization in the case of sexual exploitation of 
clients. For instance, the therapist objectifies and 
possesses the client as sexual object to fulfil the 
personal ends of sexual gratification. This kind of 
sexual exploitation in the therapeutic context is 
viewed as an intolerable infraction of the ethics and 
code of conduct governing the practice of psychology 
(American Psychological Association, 2002). Such 
behaviour is even recognized as a kind of violence 
against the client/other. However, therapists rarely 
consider the implications of intellectual totalization, a 
far more subtle form of (Levinasian) violence against 
clients.   
 
For example, most therapists have a working 
knowledge of the diagnostic and classificatory system 
of mental illness (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). If the clinician presumes to “know” the client 
through the category “depression”, for instance, the 
danger is (at least theoretically) that the client cannot 
be or act otherwise than what this categorization and 
intellectual conceptualization would suggest. The 
depressive diagnosis encapsulates the client and 
subordinates him or her to the definitional boundaries 
of the diagnosis. When we know that a client is 
depressed, we expect and even predict certain 
depressive behaviours and outcomes (cf. Ganzach, 
2000; Westen & Weinberger, 2004). With this kind of 
egological knowing, however, the client becomes an 
“object” of the therapist’s knowledge, and is robbed 
of exteriority. Nothing mysterious or unknown 
remains – the miraculous evaporates – and the result 
is violence against the client. 
 
Psychotherapy Praxis:  Naturalism and Super-
naturalism as Modes of Relating 
 
Most clinicians, of course, probably do not intention-
ally use calculative-instrumental reasoning in their 
interactions with clients. Most clinicians do not intend 
to harm or enact violence (in the Levinasian sense) 
against their clients. On the contrary, many clinicians 
experience themselves as having genuine concerns for 
their clients, and these genuine concerns are often 
believed to be independent of any instrumental ends 
on the clinician’s part. These concerns are manifest in 
the therapist’s efforts to help clients achieve 
psychological health and well-being. Surely, these 
concerns for the client prevent the kind of 
manipulative, means/end calculation, and even 
violence, in relationships that has been described 
previously. Despite these genuine efforts, however, 
there appear to be moments in psychotherapy when 
therapists unwittingly close down possibilities for 
clients by denying their sacredness, and then the 
relational miracle cannot occur. Consider the 
following account of what occurred in the case of a 
particularly challenging adolescent client whom I will 
call “Ryan”2.     
 
While Ryan is the defined client in this case, the real 
subject of the case for the purpose of this paper is the 
therapist – the author of this paper, myself – and my 
experience of the client. We will see that there were 
particular modes of relatedness (both naturalistic and 
supernaturalistic) that emerged between me, the other 
group psychotherapy members and the client that had 
a decided impact on the client and the group as a 
whole. When the predominant mode of relating to and 
understanding the client was from a naturalistic frame 
of reference, specific kinds of consequences for the 
client and the group followed. When the predominant 
mode of relating to and understanding the client was 
from a supernaturalistic frame of reference, specific 
kinds of consequences followed. However, both 
frames of reference, at least in the beginning, were 
tacit and unacknowledged, working their influence 
silently and unconsciously. Part of the purpose of 
writing about such a therapeutic experience is to 
make the frames of reference that helped to shape the 
therapy and their consequences more fully known.   
 
A Case Example  
 
Ryan was under court order to attend group therapy 
for adolescent sexual offenders after being charged 
with the molestation of a young child. Upon his 
admission to the group, Ryan made perfectly clear his 
negative feelings and attitudes toward social law, 
adults and authorities in general, and counsellors in 
particular. Throughout his tenure in the group, Ryan 
constantly denied any responsibility for the alleged 
perpetration, relying on a defensive strategy of 
blaming others, including his alleged victim. Other 
adolescent members of the group tried in vain to give 
Ryan feedback about his blaming and denial. Ryan 
continued to reject and deflect their efforts and 
expressed his disdain of the group and its members. 
At one point, Ryan just stopped participating, pulling 
his feet up into his chair, leaning over his arms, and 
                                                 
2 “Ryan” is a pseudonym used to protect the client’s 
identity. In this instance, protecting the identity of the 
client also necessitated altering some of the details of the 
case study. 
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staring through the window.   
 
As one of the co-therapists (and a training clinician) 
in the group, I felt ambivalent about Ryan. On the one 
hand, I knew his history contained a series of painful 
and even traumatic events including abandonment by 
his father, a substance-abusing mother, and multiple 
foster-care placements. My hope was that, if Ryan 
experienced consistent and healthy relationships 
through his interpersonal interactions in the group, he 
might begin to feel safe enough to accept 
responsibility for his part in the alleged perpetration 
and gradually loosen his defensive posture. On the 
other hand, Ryan seemed resistant to treatment, 
projecting a cavalier and defiant attitude toward 
others. He could be a charming young man, but his 
charm was often used to further his own agenda. If 
anyone in the group challenged his often-times self-
serving motivations, he became hostile and attacking.    
 
Naturalistic Modes of Relationship 
 
Ryan’s angry and defensive behaviour began to wear 
on the group members and therapists as his behaviour 
was recapitulated week after week. I found myself 
feeling frustration and even anger with Ryan as he 
continued to reject other group members’ invitations 
for interpersonal interaction. It was at this point that I 
began to view Ryan not so much as a separate person 
with his own ends and possibility, but as a hindrance 
to my own goals for the group. In my eyes, Ryan and 
his pathology were clearly derailing the progress of 
the group. I began to view Ryan instrumentally, in 
terms of whether he was facilitating or blocking what 
I considered to be the larger purposes of the group. 
Initially, the other group leader and I had discussed 
Ryan’s potential diagnosis as Conduct Disorder, but 
as Ryan’s behaviour became increasingly disruptive, 
the initially provisional diagnosis and its symptom 
specifications became more salient in relation to Ryan 
as the group continued. That is, I began to relate all of 
Ryan’s actions in the group to the diagnosis itself. 
Everything he said or did seemed to confirm what the 
Conduct Disorder diagnosis delineated. Eventually, it 
was difficult for me to see Ryan as anything except a 
conduct disordered adolescent.   
 
Borrowing from the language of Levinas (1961/ 
1969), I “totalized” Ryan. I submitted and reduced 
him to the intellectual category of Conduct Disorder, 
and I could not imagine him being anything more 
than what that diagnosis suggested and outlined. In 
other words, I presumed to “know” all that he was or 
ever would be based upon his diagnosis. Ryan was 
surely destined for a grim future that I was certain 
would culminate in escalating antisocial behaviour 
and a prison sentence. In short, I lost hope for the 
possibility of any change in Ryan. In my mind, he 
was determined to the bleak life predicted by his 
diagnostic pathology.   
 
The point here, at least from the perspective of 
Levinas (1961/1969), is that I lost sight of my ethical 
obligation to this client. I totalized him within the 
constraints of a diagnostic category, and therefore I 
failed to see the “absolute otherness” or “exteriority” 
that grounded his sacredness. From a totalizing 
perspective, he could only be a hardened perpetrator 
and a manipulator of others. In a more Heideggerian 
(1959/1966) vein, I had failed to maintain a 
contemplative attitude before Ryan, and had thus 
failed to remain open to the possibility of the mystery 
– the augury – in him. Rather, I had adopted a 
calculating perspective. I had presumed to know 
everything that there was to know about him, even to 
the point of projecting a dismal and probably criminal 
future for him. I had forgotten Heidegger’s cautionary 
insight – that one has access only to an incomplete or 
partial profile of others, and that it is in this 
incompleteness that the mystery, or the possibility of 
possibilities, lies. As van den Berg (1961) would say, 
rather than bringing Ryan “near”, and rather than 
viewing him as someone with possibilities – which, 
for van den Berg, constitutes the miraculous – he was 
set aside and labelled a nuisance. He was thus cast 
aside as a hopeless case rather than brought “near” 
into the potential possibility of alternative, pro-social 
behaviours.   
 
While I certainly did not have a clear sense of it at the 
time, I was viewing Ryan through a naturalistic frame 
of reference, or disclosing a naturalistic relationship 
with Ryan. I say that I did not have a clear sense of it 
at the time, because much of the disclosure of Ryan 
through a naturalistic frame of reference and my 
rendering of him as a hopeless case occurred tacitly 
and covertly. I did not possess (at the time) a thematic 
awareness of the therapeutic relationship as grounded 
in use-value, instrumentality and totalization. 
Nevertheless, I had performed a kind of intellectual 
reductionism on Ryan in addition to treating him 
instrumentally by placing my own therapy goals over 
and above his personhood. In addition, I had placed 
Ryan at great relational distance from me as a result 
of the instrumentality and totalization. All of these 
naturalistic prejudices had negative consequences for 
Ryan, as we will see. 
 
Supernaturalistic Modes of Relationship  
 
One week, Ryan arrived for group, and, to the 
surprise and shock of everyone in the group, he 
admitted his responsibility in the alleged abuse 
incidents. He articulated a desire to “change his life”, 
and asked the group for help in setting new life goals. 
Initially, I listened to Ryan with suspicion and 
hesitation, looking for a hidden and manipulative 
agenda on his part that would explain his sudden shift 
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in understanding. As he continued, however, I 
became convinced of his sincerity. I was absolutely 
stunned by him, and suddenly I felt humbled and 
ashamed. I was ashamed because I had given up hope 
for Ryan and his possibilities for change, and, in the 
face of that shame, I apologized to him in the group. 
 
It was a watershed moment, not only for me 
personally as a training clinician, but for Ryan, as 
well as for the group as a whole. Indeed, it was a 
miracle. Who would have suspected such a response 
from Ryan? Certainly not anyone like myself who 
had been making the tacit naturalistic assumptions 
that I had been making. The “miracle” is that Ryan’s 
disclosure at that particular moment allowed for a 
relational shift and change in the group such that 
everyone in the group could see Ryan, or see a part of 
him that had previously remained concealed. In other 
words, there was an abrupt shift in the pattern that 
Ryan and I had established with my frozen perception 
of Ryan as a hopeless case and Ryan’s self-fulfilling 
behaviours. Openness to this shift was crucial to the 
relational miracle. Ryan himself had to be open to the 
unanticipated shift in the pattern of his behaviour. I 
had to be open to the unanticipated shift in the 
pattern, and the group members had to be open to it. 
 
Once a space for this openness was created, it was as 
if we saw Ryan for the first time. In Levinasian terms, 
it was a disclosure of the infinite, in which one 
becomes aware of the other’s excess or infinity. The 
danger, from this perspective, is in slipping back into 
totalization and denying this vision of the infinite, by 
choosing instead to continue to see Ryan as 
containable or knowable within the boundaries of a 
conduct disordered youth. If I had chosen the route of 
totalization, I might have chosen to interpret Ryan’s 
sudden declaration of accountability as manipulation 
rather than sincere motivation to change, with the 
possibility of the miracle thus dissipating.   
 
Being willing to disclose to Ryan within a 
supernaturalistic context meant that the group 
suddenly had the therapeutic space to discuss what 
my apology meant to Ryan – what it meant to have an 
authority-figure and a maternal-figure apologize for 
giving up on him. Ryan articulated how hurt, angry 
and dejected he had felt by what he had considered to 
be my earlier rejection and abandonment of him, and 
how his entire life had felt like a series of similar 
rejections and abandonments. These are the negative 
consequences of a naturalistic disclosure.   
 
Ryan had felt deeply hurt by my rejection of him, and 
angered by my refusal to recognize his personhood. 
We often feel angry when someone violates or falsely 
accuses some aspect of our behaviour. Ryan had 
rightly felt violated by my refusal to recognize his 
possibilities for change. In sizing Ryan up through my 
own intellectual analysis, I had presumed that he 
would continue to behave as he had always continued 
to behave. In my intellectual and clinical judgment, 
he was on a predictable trajectory of antisocial 
behaviour. This is the danger of the naturalistic view 
and the totalization that accompanies it – an insidious 
determinism and hopelessness. 
 
What was different in this current relational and 
psychotherapeutic exchange with Ryan, however, was 
that few had apologized to him in this way before, 
and this apology led to a whole new life of feeling in 
him, including feelings of hope and of being cared 
for. These feelings, in turn, led to feelings of 
redemption and healing in Ryan. Like openness, 
hopefulness is a crucial ingredient in the relational 
miracle. Once I could see Ryan’s possibilities for 
change – that is, once I was hopeful in relation to him 
(rather than hopeless) – the miracle in the relationship 
was underway. Indeed, once both Ryan and I myself 
were hopeful, our relationship was immediately 
transformed. Hopefulness shatters the boundaries of 
our (intellectual) beliefs and expectations of the other 
and allows for the emergence of the unanticipated and 
the unexpected. We maintain a hopeful attitude in 
spite of what might be predicted diagnostically or 
experientially about the client. In this way, 
hopefulness is contrasted against the predictability 
and lawfulness of naturalistic disclosures.   
 
Before this, I had experienced Ryan as a hindrance to 
therapy and as a delinquent dead-end case. This is 
what would have been predicted by Ryan’s diagnosis 
and by my naturalistic disclosure of him. However, in 
the face of both his transformation and my openness 
and hopefulness, I saw possibility, responsibility and 
hope for Ryan’s future. This is the context of a 
supernatural disclosure. Inversely, whereas Ryan had 
previously felt hurt, dejected and misunderstood, he 
now felt hopeful and appreciated. However, none of 
this would have been conceivable had I not been 
willing to humble myself in order to see what 
Heidegger (1959/1966) might call Ryan’s mystery or 
what Levinas (1961/1969) might describe as Ryan’s 
exteriority or the emergence of the infinite. Indeed, 
had I persisted in a naturalistic disclosure, I very 
likely would have interpreted Ryan’s behaviour as 
manipulative and disingenuous, and nothing would 
have become of the healing, redemption or 
miraculous in Ryan. For the miracle to occur, one 
must be willing to acknowledge the indescribable 
excess that defines the other and which eludes our 
comprehension – the recognition of the sacred in the 
other. This is the crux of a supernatural relationship.   
 
Some might wonder about clients who seemingly 
resist change for much longer than Ryan. For 
instance, what if Ryan had never actively taken 
responsibility for the alleged perpetration of abuse? 
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Ryan might never have questioned his initial 
manipulation and alleged sexual violence against 
others. Clients, in general, might fail to act in ways 
that contradict and challenge their diagnoses, 
continuing instead to live out dysfunctional and 
destructive patterns of behaviour. This failure to 
change, however, does not mean that miracles cannot 
occur. Therapists can always invite miracles by 
creating a relational space that is characterized by 
therapeutic and relational openness and hopefulness. 
In the case of Ryan, the possibility for change was 
ever-present. I simply chose to conceal those 
possibilities in the naturalistic manner in which I 
disclosed Ryan. Hence, the danger is to lose hope for 
a client or to lose the capacity for therapeutic 
openness. To lose either of these capacities is to deny 
and destroy any possibilities for client change, which 
really ultimately means that the possibility for 
relationships (that is, relational miracles) and psycho-
therapy itself are destroyed.    
 
Conclusion and Implications for Psychotherapy 
  
Some consequences follow for psychotherapy when 
therapists attempt to disclose clients in a supernatural 
mode of relationship. Firstly, if others are irreducible 
– if they resist our total comprehension given their 
infinitesimal mystery – then any knowledge therapists 
might have of their clients must be held tentatively. 
That is, regardless of what therapists “know” about 
their clients in terms of case conceptualization and 
diagnosis, clients continue to resist and elude that 
conceptualization. If therapists fail to respect and 
recognize this mystery, this fundamental sacredness, 
then the possibility of the miraculous cannot occur. 
God, or the divine, can only stand next to us as an 
embodied other – as the client – if we allow the 
mystery and the sacredness to reveal itself, and this 
requires a stance that accepts a provisional, tentative 
and incomplete knowledge of the client.   
 
Many therapists might argue that they already hold 
their psychological knowledge tentatively or 
cautiously in relation to clients. For instance, many 
clinicians understand that, in practical contexts, the 
DSM categories are not objectively delineated 
categories, but descriptive guidelines that should 
never overshadow clients themselves (Frances, First, 
& Pincus, 1995).   
 
Hence, some therapists may protest that they do not 
so readily reduce clients to diagnostic categories. 
Surely I am simply being a theoretical bull in a 
therapeutic china shop. However, I would submit that 
I am the kind of person, and that many of my 
colleagues are the kinds of persons, who are keenly 
aware of this kind of therapeutic reductionism and its 
consequences, and who therefore try very explicitly to 
avoid it, and yet often fail. Despite being mindful of 
the limitations of the diagnostic categories, it is 
seductively easy to intellectually (and tacitly) attempt 
to contain clients within the categories themselves. 
Because, in many respects, the DSM categories act as 
organizing cognitive frameworks for understanding 
clients, and, because such frameworks are probably 
necessary for making sense of phenomena 
(Nickerson, 1998), it is easier than we might think to 
overshadow and even dominate clients with these 
frameworks.    
 
Secondly, humility is an essential component of the 
supernatural mode of relationship and a necessary 
ingredient for the miraculous in relationships. In part, 
this means that therapists must relinquish their expert 
status if occupying this status means presuming to 
know everything about the client (intellectual 
reductionism) or if it means treating the client as a 
means to further some therapeutic and contractual end 
(instrumentalism). As we saw in the case of Ryan, 
humility was indispensable to the emerging miracle, 
because humility allowed Ryan’s sacredness and 
mystery to shine through. Indeed, when Ryan was 
faced with a naturalistic relational context of 
instrumentality and reductionism, it evoked only 
defensiveness and anger. Ryan was angry and hurt 
when he was faced with my rejection and wholesale 
categorization of him, and this intellectual 
categorization served only to anger and isolate him 
even further. The saving grace of the case, however, 
was humility. In the case of Ryan, I was humbled 
before another’s sacredness – not arrogantly certain – 
and I was humbled before my own inability to know, 
rather than instrumental and calculative. 
 
Thirdly, therapists who disclose clients in a 
supernatural mode of relatedness maintain an 
attunement to surprise. That is, such therapists 
actively search for therapeutic instances in which the 
client surprises the therapist by behaving in a manner 
that is unanticipated. In many respects, these surprises 
are the sparks of therapeutic miracles that can either 
come to fruition or be ignored, overlooked and 
ultimately destroyed. Being surprised means that the 
therapist catches sight of the client’s sacredness and 
mystery, because the client’s unanticipated behaviour 
challenges the grounds of the therapist’s assumptions 
and provides a glimpse into the client’s infiniteness or 
unbounded incomprehensibility. This recognition of 
the client’s incomprehensibility is what gives the 
client possibility. Therapists ought to explore these 
surprising or unanticipated moments - moments when 
the depressed client laughs or makes a joke, moments 
in which the antisocial client takes responsibility - 
because these are the miracles that allow therapists 
and clients to see alternatives, hope and possibility. 
Indeed, being attuned to surprise is to be attuned to 
miracles, the miracles that bring redemption and 
healing to psychotherapy relationships.   
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